Lavi: A Lesson in Unintended Consequences

For those that might have missed it, I recently published an article under Tablet (an online Jewish and Israeli issues magazine), exploring how the cancellation of the Lavi has today circumscribed Israel's abilities to influence the kinds of military aircraft that are available or offered to the IDF in the 21st century:
https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/271289/killing-the-lavi

Ultimately, the cancellation of the Lavi was not merely a question of losing an indigenous Israeli manufacturing capability, that would be difficult if not impossible to resurrect decades later. Rather, without the possible threat of an indigenous Israeli option, Israel's ability to influence the kinds of aircraft that the United States might offer for sale to the IDF has been seriously curtailed. Without that leverage, the IDF is no longer the master of its own destiny when it comes to the kinds of combat aircraft available for Israeli use, and the degree to which Israeli sensors, navigation and weapons systems are allowed to be integrated into future Israeli warplanes.
This has become the lasting, unexpected legacy for the cancellation of the Lavi.

Lavi - The Controversy Continues 30 Years Later

Even now, decades after the fact, the controversy surrounding the cancellation of the Lavi program remains unresolved, as evidenced by two recent columns on the subject published in Israel's Haaretz.

The first, from former Defense Minister Moshe Arens, outlines three lies that were used by the opponents of the airplane to convince Israel's Cabinet to cancel the program in August of 1987.[1] The three lies were:

• The unit price of the airplane was quoted on the basis of 80 aircraft, rather than on a larger production run of 200 aircraft - which would have been better aligned with the number of warplanes that the IDF actually intended to purchase over the next two decades.
• The Cabinet was informed that Israel's air force instead planned to purchase the Advanced Tactical Fighter (which later became the F-22) from the United States, which was then under development - despite the fact that the U.S. had not offered the airplane for sale to Israel or to any other nation, and had no intention of doing so.
• The Cabinet was misled regarding the number of engineers and technicians that would be laid off in the event of a vote to cancel the program, with an array of theoretical development programs proposed which never materialized and which were never proposed again.

As many of us are aware, Dr. Arens was among the Lavi program's most vocal champions within the Israeli government.

The second article published in Haaretz was a rebuttal from Kobi Richter, who headed the Weapons Department division for Israel's air force from 1983 to 1986.[2] Kobi Richter outlines his reasons for opposing the Lavi development program, mostly surrounding the eventual cost of procuring and maintaining a small fleet of unique Israeli-built warplanes. Nowhere, however, does Kobi Richter refute any of the three points made by Dr. Arens regarding how the Israeli Cabinet was misled in order to secure a vote in favor of cancelling the program.

Unfortunately, the controversy surrounding the Lavi is likely to remain indefinitely, with supporters and opponents of the program unconvinced by the arguments from the other side.


References:
[1] Moshe Arens, "The Three Lies That Shot Down the Lavi, the World's Greatest Israeli Fighter Aircraft," Haaretz (Sept 28, 2017).
[2] Kobi Richter, "I Opposed Building Israeli Fighter Jet Based on the Truth," Haaretz (Oct 2, 2017).

Japan's F-2 and the Lavi: The Road Not Taken

I was recently asked in an email if I might draw a comparison between the Lavi, and Japan's F-2 fighter.

As was pointed out in my book on the Lavi, prior to launching the Lavi program, Israel's government had twice asked for permission to set up a local assembly line for the F-16 in Israel, similar to what had already been granted for NATO partners in Europe, as well as to the local assembly lines that would later be granted for the F-16 in Turkey and South Korea. Israel was denied this option on both occasions, once in 1977 and again in 1980. Had the F-16 gone into production in Israel, it would have afforded Israeli developers an opportunity to modify the aircraft - which had originally been envisioned as a lightweight air-to-air day fighter - into the more versatile, multirole platform that the IDF required.

There were two, highly evolved versions of the F-16 which would later be developed, which provide some insight into the options that a local, Israeli assembly line might have afforded the IDF. The first was the F-16XL, a radically different, cranked-arrow delta-winged derivative of the F-16, which first flew in 1982. The second was the Mitsubishi F-2 which first flew in 1995. Both aircraft provide insight into what an evolved F-16 platform could accomplish.

The Mitsubishi F-2 was developed out of General Dynamics' conceptual proposals to the U.S. Air Force for the "Agile Falcon" program, which was intended to recover some of the air-to-air performance that had been eroded as the F-16 had been tasked with ever expanding air-to-ground roles. Between the Block 10 and the Block 40 editions of the F-16, the airplane had evolved from an empty weight of 15,140-lb (6,870-kg), to an empty weight of 19,020-lb (8,630-kg), as additional structural weight was added to increase its maximum payload capacity. New engine technologies had allowed the F-16 to effectively maintain its thrust-to-weight ratio, but they could not restore the effects of the added weight on wing loading. The Agile Falcon was intended to correct this, producing a derivative fighter with an expanded range and payload capacity, that also mirrored the earlier, intended wing loading of the Block 10 F-16A.

The F-2 was intended to recover the erosion in wing loading that had accompanied later models of the F-16.

Although the U.S. Air Force elected not to fund the Agile Falcon program, it was later proposed as a contendor for Japan's FS-X domestic fighter development effort. The F-2 fighter that resulted from this program, features a stretched fuselage, with an added center-plug section, but with an all-new wing that adds 25-percent to the wing area, as well as an enlarged horizontal tail. As a direct derivative of the F-16, the F-2 shared over 20% of its components with its U.S.-built predecessor - in contrast to the Lavi which, despite superficial similarities, bore no parts commonality with the earlier F-16. The added wing area allowed the F-2 to increase the available weapons stations from nine to eleven. Like the Lavi, the F-2 featured additional fuel capacity and external weapons load.

The F-2 features an empty weight of some 21,000-lb (9530 kg), with a maximum take-off weight of some 48,700-lb (22,100-kg). This compares to a Lavi empty weight of some 15,310-lb (6,940-kg), with a maximum take-off weight of some 42,500-lb (19,280-kg). Despite its larger size and greater take-off weight, it should therefore come as no surprise that the F-2 would offer slightly poorer range performance than the Lavi - as it also had to carry the additional empty weight that made its higher take-off weight possible. The F-2 also included a Japanese-developed avionics suite, including the first AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar to enter service on a production fighter, as well as a modernized cockpit. To afford a wider field-of-view for the head-up display (HUD), the F-2 replaced the single-piece F-16 canopy with a two-piece canopy, much like the Lavi had done, to protect the pilot from a fragmented HUD in the event of an ejection.

A Mitsubishi F-2 takes off for a training sortie, its F-16 lineage clearly evident.

The composite wing for the F-2, developed locally by Mitsubishi, was one of the more radical features to appear on the Japanese F-16 derivative. It featured a co-cured, all-composite structure, unlike the composite wing of the Lavi which featured a composite skin secured by fasteners to conventional metal spars. The Lavi developers had actually explored the option for developing an all-composite wing structure for the Lavi, but had backed away from it as too costly and ambitious at the time - after an initial co-cured test article had failed during test. The Japanese developers, however, continued to pursue this concept, to take the maximum benefit possible from composite weight savings. This remained, however, a relatively new and immature technology, with the F-2 static structures prototype developing cracks in its wing structure as the design continued to be learned out.

Among the most striking differences between the Lavi and the F-2 program, however, was cost. Japan's government originally envisioned a requirement for 141 F-2 fighters, a total which would eventually be reduced to a mere 94 aircraft. This represented a very small production run indeed. Japan's consitution forbade Japan from seeking export customers for the fighter, something which had also helped to persuade the U.S. government to permit Japan to develop the F-2 with extensive U.S. assistance. With such a small production run, it was no surprise that the unit cost would be considerably higher than for a similar, Block 52+ F-16, or even higher than the projected cost for the Lavi as envisioned under its original 300-aircraft production program. What was more surprising, however, was the high development price associated with the F-2. The entire Lavi development program, including flight testing, had been estimated by the U.S. General Accounting Office to total no more than $1.90 billion, in Fiscal 1985 dollars. Normalized against the same Fiscal Year currency, the F-2 would cost Japan a total of $2.31 billion to develop - a considerable amount for what had been sold as a relatively low-cost, derivative fighter program. The costs associated with developing the all-new, composite wing, as well as the all-new, Japanese avionics suite, eventually overshadowed the cost savings from utilizing an existing U.S. design as a starting point for the airframe.

The F-2 has of course gone on to serve the Japan Air Self-Defense Force well, and has provided an important technology development and learning milestone for the Japanese aerospace industry. It was not, however, an inexpensive alternative.

Thanks again to William Zhou for suggesting this topic.

Lavi Armament - Stores and Weapons Stations

I recently received an email question inquiring into the weapons stations and stores arrangement of the Lavi.

The weapons compliment for the Lavi has been described in a number of key sources. The Lavi had a total of fifteen weapons stations, as illustrated in the figure below (adapted from Tsach and Peled, 16th ICAS, p. 836). This included six weapons stations on or under the wings (portrayed in red), seven weapons stations under the fuselage (portrayed in blue), and two weapons stations on each side of the engine inlet (portrayed in green).

Lavi hardpoints for fuel, weapons and sensor integration

How these hard points might be employed in practice is portrayed in the next two diagrams (obtained from Shmul, et al, Int. J. Control, p. 160). The first illustration portrays the Lavi in the "cluster bomb" configuration, with a large number of individual stores loaded. In this configuration includes fuel tanks loaded on the innermost wing hardpoints, cluster-bombs loaded on the outer under-wing hardpoints, and six cluster bombs loaded under the fuselage. A pair of heat-seeking air-to-air missiles would also have been loaded on the missile rails. Noteworthy is the fact that the under-fuselage hard points were staggered, rather situated directly in-line, to accommodate the landing gear and landing gear bay doors.

Lavi in the "cluster bomb" loading configuration.

The subsequent illustration portrays the Lavi in the "HOBO" configuration, which would have aimed at maximizing range. This configuration includes drop tanks installed at the innermost wing hardpoints, iron-bombs loaded on the outer under-wing hardpoints, as well as heat-seeking air-to-air missiles installed on the wing tip missile rails, and navigation and targeting pods installed on the weapons stations located on each side of the engine inlet.

Lavi in the "HOBO" weapons configuration.

A Lavi prototype in flight test with a centerline telemetry pod (IAF photo)

In flight test, the centerline fuselage hardpoint was sometimes utilized to integrate a telemetry package. This was done on the Lavi Technology Demonstrator (the number three prototype), allowing the rear cockpit seat position (which was used to house telemetry in the previous prototypes) to be freed up.

Examples of stores installed on the outer wing weapons station can be seen in wind tunnel footage - as part of a series of tests to assess wing flutter with a variety of stores configurations.

Lavi wing tunnel model from weapons integration test

Thanks again to William Zhou for asking this question.


References:
Shmul, Menachem, Eli Erenthal, and Moshe Attar, “Lavi Flight Control System,” International Journal of Control, No. 1, 1994: 159-182.
Tsach, S., and A. Peled, “Evolution of the Lavi Fighter Aircraft”, in Proceedings of the 16th International Council of the Aeronautical Sciences (ICAS) (Jerusalem: Aug. 28 - Sept. 2, 1988): 827-841. 

The Lavi and the F-16XL: A Contrast in Parallel Development Programs

I recently received an email question asking about whether the existence of the F-16XL, as an alternative to the Lavi, played a role in any of the Lavi decisions process.

As outlined in Chapter 4 of the book, the Israeli air force originally expressed a preference for a locally produced version of the F-16 as the most cost effect means towards meeting Israel's future fighter needs. As proposed by the Israeli government in March 1977, the original plan called for Israel to purchase its first 50 F-16 fighters directly from the United States, with local assembly for a follow-on batch of 200 aircraft. Local assembly would have allowed the Israelis to modify the F-16 to meet their own needs, which centered around producing a more versatile air-to-ground platform - as opposed to the original F-16A, which had been envisioned as an air-to-air day fighter with a secondary air-to-ground role.

At the time that the Israeli proposal was made in 1977, the F-16XL was not yet on the drawing boards at General Dynamics. However, it is entirely plausible that had an Israeli assembly line been authorized for the F-16 (as similar assembly lines would later be approved for Turkey and South Korea), that the Israelis may have eventually produced a production version of the F-16XL - particularly after the US Air Force declined to produce the type for domestic service (in favor of the more expensive F-15E). Again, it's one of those "what if" scenarios we will never have a complete answer for.

The Israeli government proposed license production of the F-16 in Israel on two occasions - in March 1977 and again in February 1980. On both occasions, their proposals were rejected by the Carter Administration for its own political reasons. The Israelis subsequently went on to authorize development of the Lavi.

The F-16XL illustrates its impressive bombload

The F-16XL in turn, grew out of a series of General Dynamic concept studies generated during the late 1970s, originally aimed at a supersonic cruise demonstrator aircraft, not a fighter-bomber. It didn't received formal US Air Force funding as a fighter development effort until 1980 - the same year that the Lavi program was launched. So the two aircraft were truly contemporaries. Their results paralleled each other, with little opportunity for the learning from one to directly influence the other. Nonetheless, both development teams benefited from some of the same prior industry experience. They all read the same engineering journals, and were aware of the same first principals. As pointed out in Appendix 4, for example, both the Lavi and the F-16XL benefited from semi-conformal weapons carriage to reduce stores drag.  Relative to conventional pylon-mounted stores, both aircraft demonstrated better than a 40% reduction in stores drag.

The two were nonetheless different aircraft with different design opportunities, and limitations. The F-16XL was intended to control its cost by exercising an existing F-16 fuselage, with the addition of a plug for added fuel volume, plus its unique cranked-arrow wing. The Lavi, in contrast, was a clean sheet design. The Lavi developers had more latitude to optimize their configuration, but had to strictly control the airplane's size if they wanted to control production costs on what was expected to be a relatively small production run of some 300 airframes. The F-16XL resulted in a bigger airplane, with a larger range and payload. The Lavi resulted in a very compact package with an astounding range for its small size. Again, the two design teams operated from different restrictions on what they could or couldn't do. Both great designs, but with different limitations.

Thanks again to Harry Zertner for the question.

Lavi - A Book Review from the Air Force Research Institute

My book on the Lavi was recently reviewed by Maj Matthew C. Wunderlich (USAF), on behalf of the Air Force Research Institute.
http://afri.au.af.mil/review_full.asp?id=906

For those who are less familiar with it, the Air Force Research Institute sponsors the quarterly Air & Space Power Journal, as well as the Air University Press which publishes its own collection of aviation-themed titles.

As Maj Wunderlich notes, "individual personalities in the Israeli and US governments, complemented by repeated financial crises, ultimately doomed the cutting-edge Lavi program." The ramifications of these events, and the lessons in real world politics that they hold, remain relevant for us even to this day.  As Maj Wunderlich points out,

The themes of airpower dominance, technological innovation, and aviation acquisition provide critical lessons learned from the Lavi that readily translate to contemporary issues facing the United States Air Force.

As I pointed out in a previous posting, no one writes a book like this in the belief that they are going to make their fortunes as an author. You write a book such as this because you have something to say. It has been my sincere hope that the lessons of these events might yet be learned by future generations.

Lavi - A Retrospective Journey - Video and PDF

Video edition for Lavi: A Retrospective Journey.

Original chart pack is available below:

Lavi - A Retrospective Journey

In the words of former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens, the Lavi was "Israel's single most ambitious and important technological program." It was not only Israel's largest defense program throughout the 1980s, but the largest technological undertaking by the State of Israel either before, or since.

The following summary provides a retrospective overview for the Lavi program, covering its political and historical chronology. It is intended to act as a supplement to the technological survey that I published online previously, and draws heavily from the book on the Lavi program that was published earlier this year.

To provide a little background about myself, I have been an engineering analyst and manager in the U.S. aerospace industry for over two decades, involved in the development and support of propulsion systems for a variety of U.S. and international aircraft programs - including the F-15, F-16, F-22 and F-35. The opinions expressed here are my own, and do not necessarily reflect those of my employers, either past or present.

An Egyptian Mirage 5 Fighter at Cairo West

The Israel Defense Force has a long history of modifying the weapons systems that is procures to meet its specific defense requirements. A case in point is provided by the Dassault Mirage 5 fighter-bomber, an evolved version of the French Mirage III interceptor with added fuel and payload capacity, intended to transform the air-to-air Mirage into a more versatile, air-to-ground platform. The Mirage 5 was developed to meet Israel's specific requirements during the latter 1960s, with final aircraft assembly to take place in Israel. Deliveries, however, were suspended when the French government imposed an arms embargo on Israel following the 1967 Six Day War. The French would go on to sell the Mirage 5 to Israel's neighbors, including both Libya and Egypt - but not to Israel. Israel's cooperative experience with the co-production program, however, would nonetheless provide the basis for later Israeli domestic fighter aircraft production, including the manufacture of both the Nesher and Kfir fighter-bombers.

One of the first F-16As to be supplied to Israel.

By the mid-1970s, however, the Israeli government had refocused its fighter aircraft procurement efforts towards acquiring U.S.-developed aircraft, with the General Dynamics' F-16 becoming the primary focus for future Israeli fighter modernization efforts. In 1977 the Israeli government proposed a co-production scheme whereby the first 50 Israeli F-16 fighters would have been procured directly from the United States, with a further 200 to be manufactured locally in Israel. This would have provided the Israeli military with an opportunity to optimize the F-16 to meet specific Israeli needs, including the incorporation of additional air-to-ground capabilities and munitions. The proposal, however, was rejected by the Carter administration, as well as being opposed by the airplane's manufacturer, General Dynamics.

An Israeli Merkava Mk 2 - first developed in the 1970s

Israeli weapons requirements have been unique, and different from those of the United States or other major weapons suppliers due to Israel's unique tactical and strategic situation. Foremost among these influences have been Israel's small size, and sensitivity to casualties. This reality is perhaps best embodied in the design of Israel's Merkava main battle tank. Developed in the 1970s to meet Israel's specific requirements, at a time when tanks under development elsewhere in the world were emphasizing either mobility or firepower, the Merkava was designed with an emphasis on crew protection. In addition to its advanced armored protection system, unique among modern tank designs, the Merkava was designed with the engine located in front of the crew - so that if the tank's armor were ever to be breached, an exploding shell would be more likely to damage the engine than the crew. This design was no accident, but was rather an outgrowth of Israeli sensitivity to casualties on the battlefield. The tank could be repaired or replaced. Its crew could not.

Similarly, Israel's small size and lack of strategic depth have translated into a military strategy that relies on transferring the battle onto enemy territory, and away from Israeli population centers, as quickly as possible. Similarly, unlike the United States, Israel cannot rely on having friendly air bases in close proximity to the command and control centers of every possible opposing adversary - meaning that Israel must rely on multirole aircraft to fulfill both short-range, air support and interceptor duties, as well as longer-range strike roles.

Flight times to Israel's population centers from neighboring air bases, at Mach 0.6 and 20,000 ft

Moreover, due to its small size, Israel's air force is constantly on the front line of Israeli's defenses, with opposing fighters operating from air bases only minutes away from Israeli population centers. In the words of one Israeli Mirage fighter pilot, some decades ago,

"At fifty thousand feet, in a supersonic Mirage, I can fly only north and south; otherwise, I’d be out of the country in a matter of seconds. You can see on one side Cyprus, Turkey – on the other Iraq and Sharm el-Sheikh. You have no trouble spotting the Suez Canal. But your own country is very difficult to see; it’s under the belly of your plane. You have to turn around and look back to see it. You become very aware of its smallness."

The 2nd Lavi prototype at the official roll-out ceremony

The Lavi program was consequently launched in February 1980, to meet Israel's specific fighter needs for a more versatile fighter-bomber platform. As originally envisioned, it would have been a small, short-range close-air-support aircraft. However, the airplane's size was increased in May 1981 to allow it to also fulfill the long-range strike role. The first prototype flew in December 1986. As designed, the airplane offered a platform with 50% more strike radius than a contemporary Block 40 F-16C, while maintaining a 20% lower empty weight. It also reserved volume for an avionics suite that was 80% larger by weight than that featured on Israel's original batch of F-16As - allowing it to internally integrate a sophisticated, Israeli-developed electronic warfare suite that made it be far more survivable in contested airspace.

President Reagan endorses Lavi funding

Much of the controversy that would subsequently surround the Lavi centered on the application of U.S. military assistance funds to help finance its development. This financial support was an outgrowth of the extensive U.S. industrial involvement in the program, with roughly half of the aircraft expected to be manufactured in the United States. Wherever possible, off-the-shelf components had been leveraged to reduce the overall cost of the program. Everything from the airplane's fly-by-wire control computers, to actuators, to the composite wings and tail were contracted to U.S. suppliers.

This extensive U.S. involvement led then President Ronald Reagan to formally endorse the application of U.S. military assistance funds towards the Lavi development effort in November of 1983. This public endorsement was subsequently codified as part of the U.S. military aid package to Israel under the Kemp-Long Amendment, which allowed Israel to apply existing security assistance funds towards the Lavi program.

Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, hijacked by the PLO in 1985

President Reagan's endorsement of the Lavi , however, was vigorously opposed by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who had a long history of opposing U.S. cooperation with Israel, of whatever variety. Weinberger had been a repeated proponent for suspending the delivery of weapons to Israel, including the delivery of jet fighter aircraft, in response to various U.S. and Israeli policy disagreements. This occurred following Israel's Osirak reactor raid, for example, which had eliminated Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons plant, as well as during Israel's 1982 Lebanon War. Weinberger would similarly go on to forbid the U.S. Navy from seeking Israeli assistance in staging a rescue attempt for the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, which was hijacked by PLO terrorists with American citizens on board. Going further, Weinberger would cemented his anti-Israel bias during the negotiations for the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon, where he passed along secret U.S.-Israeli understandings to Saudi officials, who in turn passed the information along to the leadership of the PLO to improve their bargaining position.

Added to this was Caspar Weinberger's longstanding rivalry with Secretary of State George Shultz.  Shultz had gone on record as a key supporter for applying U.S. military assistance funding to help finance the Lavi. Shultz's endorsement alone would have marked the Lavi as a continued target for Weinberger's displeasure.

Dov Zakheim (right) greets Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir

To lead his campaign to terminate the Lavi, Weinberger appointed Dov Zakheim as his Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Planning and Resources. An accountant by training, Zakheim campaigned against the Lavi exclusively on the basis of the program's purported costs. Zakheim was also an orthodox Jew who spoke fluent Yiddish and Hebrew, which facilitated his multiple trips to Israel to lobby for the program's termination. Significantly, at no time during this lobbying campaign did the question arise as to what aircraft would best meet Israel's defensive requirements. When presented with a list of aircraft and work-share agreements that would be presented to Israel's officials as alternatives for canceling the Lavi, Caspar Weinberger's only question had been, "What will the Saudis think?" Which aircraft would best meet Israeli national security needs was never an item for consideration.

As part of this campaign, Zakheim had also arranged for all of the Lavi-related contracts with U.S. suppliers to be channeled through his office for review and approval, taking advantage of the Pentagon bureaucracy to delay the contract review process, and further hobble the program's progress. In Zakheim's own words, once the contracts arrived in his office, "We sat on them for at least a week." This delay was later extended into a full halt on all the contract reviews and approvals, at the personal direction of Caspar Weinberger. This halt would not be lifted until the threat of direct Congressional intervention arose.

Israeli Air Force Chief Amos Lapidot points out Lavi
cockpit features to Foreign Minister Shimon Peres

Within Israel the Lavi program was also controversial, due to its large price tag and the potential threat that it placed on funding for Israel's other military needs. The Lavi had both supporters, and opponents within the Israeli government and military. Among its supporters were two successive Israel Air Force chiefs, a Chief of Staff, and two successive Ministers of Defense. By the latter 1980s, however, the tide had begun to turn against the program. Foremost among the program's detractors was Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin.

To understand why the Lavi went from being a cornerstone of Israeli weapons development and defense strategy, to being the subject of intense budget debates, it is essential to understand that the Lavi was launched in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Following this war, Israeli domestic defense spending skyrocketed to new heights. In 1981 when the Lavi program was launched, Israel's domestic defense budget consumed some 23% of Israel's GDP, constituting a greater share of Israel's national income than either the Vietnam War or the Korean War had consumed in the United States, and far more than the 6% of America's GDP that was devoted at the height of the Reagan defense buildup. This heightened level of Israeli defense spending, however, was unsustainable.

When initially launched, the Israeli military projected a requirement for 300 Lavi fighters. In studies conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), it was projected that at this production level, the unit fly-away cost for the Lavi would amount to approximately $17.8 million in 1985 dollars, as compared to the cost for an F-16C outfitted with Israeli avionics, which was projected to cost around $16.9 million per copy. On this basis, the Lavi was indeed cost competitive with the F-16 or other alternatives. As Israel's defense budget began to shrink during the latter 1980s, however, and Israel's military contemplated smaller aircraft buys, the unit cost of the Lavi - with its much smaller production run - began to escalate. On a 150 aircraft purchase, it was projected that the unit cost of the Lavi would increase by some 55%, making it a much less attractive option. The only means, therefore, to maintain the cost objective for the Lavi would have been to obtain additional, export orders for the aircraft.

Obtaining these additional orders was not out of the realm of possibility. The Long Island-based Grumman Corp. had been contracted as a U.S. partner for the program, with provisions that should additional export orders for the airplane emerge, Grumman would be authorized to set up a second assembly line in the United States. Such an arrangement could easily have facilitated the submission of the Lavi as a contender in U.S. procurement competitions, where the U.S. was actively looking for a new close air support and Wild Weasel platform - roles that the Lavi had been intended to fill.

IAI workers protest the cancellation of the Lavi

The Lavi program was ultimately canceled in a vote by the Israeli Cabinet on August 30, 1987 in a narrow vote that largely followed party lines - with 12 votes in favor of cancellation, 11 opposed and one abstention. Protests by Israeli aerospace workers would last for days. Israel Aircraft Industries would layoff 4,000 employees in the immediate aftermath of the vote, including some 1,500 engineers. To put that total into perspective, as a fraction of the total population, this would have been equivalent to the United States laying off over 220,000 aerospace employees - a huge impact to the local economy.

The cancellation was a blow from which the Israeli aerospace industry has never recovered. In August of 1987 Israel Aircraft Industries employed over 22,000 workers. Today, they employ just over 16,000 - even after decades of population growth.

F-16I fitted with conformal fuel tanks

As for the Israeli Air Force, it would be the turn of the century before an evolved, long-range version of the F-16 became available - in the form of the Block 52+ F-16I. But while the F-16I boasted a strike radius some 50% greater than the earlier Block 40 F-16C, it was able to achieve this only with an empty weight that was some 10% greater than the earlier F-16C model. From a performance and survivability, standpoint the evolved F-16 still could not fully match the capabilities of the Lavi, in the role for which it had once been developed.

The F-35 - 33 of which are on order by Israel

To this day, many of the issues which surrounded the Lavi development program and the decision to launch it still remain. Today, for example, the Israel Defense Force has been actively lobbying the developer of the F-35 - Israel's next new fighter - to offer a version with additional range and payload. According to media reports, these overtures have been met with little enthusiasm on the part of Lockheed Martin - which assumes that the Israelis have no other aircraft options and will accept whatever U.S. product they are offered.

And to add a few words about the process that went into writing and publishing this book, I would start by pointing out that no one writes a book like this because they believe it will lead to their financial fortune. You write a book like this because you have something to say.

Writing this book was a process that spanned decades. I first began to explore the story behind the Lavi decades ago, as a graduate student and teaching assistant for a senior-level engineering class in airplane design. It was at that time that I first began to evaluate the trade studies that had gone into shaping the Lavi, leveraging my knowledge as an aerospace engineer to assess the airplane's design features and how they had evolved. Out of this grew the first draft of my book on the Lavi, which I submitted to a series of eight publishing houses in 1993. At that time, the manuscript was a little over 86,000 words in length. None of the original eight publishing houses were interested in the book at that time.

Taking to heart the feedback that I had received from the one publisher that had actually reviewed the original manuscript draft, I continued to refine and expand the book over the succeeding decades, fleshing out those areas where the original manuscript had required further elaboration. By the time that I was ready to resubmit the manuscript for publication in November of 2013, it had grown to over 170,000 words in length. The book was subsequently picked up by the second publisher that I had submitted it to, and a contract was signed in April of 2014. Signing the book contract was not the end of the publication process, however, but only the beginning. What followed was a series of milestones which eventually led to publication:

• April 2014 - book contract signed
• July 2014 - final manuscript submitted (reduced to 115,000 words in length at the request of the publisher)
• May 2015 - copy-edited manuscript received from the publisher (reviewed, edited and approved by the author in June 2015) 
• September 2015 - proof copy received from the publisher (reviewed, edited and approved by the author by the end of September)
• October 2015 - book index submitted by the author
• December 2015 - book submitted to the printer for release in January of 2016

In short, the process of publishing a book can be a significant task, above and beyond writing the original book manuscript, in and of itself.

A word should also be added about the relationship between the publisher and author. In this electronic age where would-be authors can independently publish their works electronically, if they choose to do so, the importance of an experienced publishing house is sometimes overlooked. As a first-time author, the contract terms will not be as generous for a new author as they might be for an established, well-known author or celebrity, and the temptation may exist to abandon traditional print media. Despite this temptation, however, an experienced publisher can be essential to opening doors, getting your book exposed and on book shelves, and ensuring a quality finished product - all opportunities that would never be available to the self-published author. It should be remembered that both author and publisher have something to bring to the table, towards making the book an eventual success, and I was fortunate to have found a good publisher that helped to make my own book into a reality.

Finally, I will emphasize again that no one writes a book like, believing that they are going to become wealthy or famous in the process. The market for history books does not lend itself to making famous authors. You write a book like this because you have something to say. It has been, and continues to be my hope that the lessons of these past events may yet go on to inform generations to come, and that the mistakes of the past need not be repeated.

Lavi - An Engineer's Perspective - Video and PDF

Video edition for Lavi: An Engineer's Perspective.

Original chart pack is available below:

Lavi - An Engineer's Perspective

The Lavi fighter program was the largest weapons development effort ever undertaken by the State of Israel - embodying a unique, Israeli perspective as to what elements were most essential in the design of a modern warplane.

The following summary provides a brief cross section of this development effort, with a focus on the technological, engineering side of the program - setting aside for the moment the historical chronology, as well as the political debates that also surrounded this aircraft. In developing this summary, I have drawn on my years of experience as an aerospace engineer, leveraging in particular the skills that I first learned as a teaching assistant for Aircraft Design more than two decades ago. It has been my experience that it is when you have to teach a subject to someone else, that you first truly master it, and it is on that experience that I have drawn heavily on here. Again, I point out that the opinions expressed here are my own, and do not necessarily represent those of my employers, either past or present.

As an aerospace engineer trained in the discipline of design, you come to see aircraft somewhat differently from the casual observer. The features that go into a design become recognizable as the products of conscious design trades, rather than the result of arbitrary selections or preferential aesthetics. In this manner, the Lavi bears a unique, and distinctively Israeli emphasis in its design and construction.

In order to appreciate many of the trades that went into the Lavi, however, it often helps to have a point of reference. To this end, there just so happens to be one particular aircraft that stands out as the natural point of comparison: the General Dynamics (later Lockheed Martin) F-16. The F-16, to which the Lavi was so often compared, provides a contemporary reference point that was, among other things, the most widely produced lightweight fighter of its day. It was also, however, designed with a slightly different focus to its development.

The F-16 was first developed during the 1970s as a lightweight air-to-air "day fighter", with a secondary air-to-ground capability. In this regard, the F-16 was following in the footsteps of such aircraft as the F-5E Tiger II, which set the standard during the Vietnam War era for what could be accomplished within a lightweight fighter configuration. Like the F-5E, the developers of the F-16A selected a thin, trapezoidal wing. While this fit in with the lightweight design concept behind the F-16, it also led to a wing configuration with limited volume available for fuel stowage - requiring the F-16 to carry the majority of the fuel that it needed to complete its mission inside its fuselage.

The Lavi, in contrast, had a very different emphasis. The Lavi was designed as an air-to-ground fighter-bomber first, with a secondary air-to-air mission. The antecedents for the Lavi design included such strike aircraft as the Kfir and the A-4 Skyhawk. Much like the A-4 Skyhawk before it, the Lavi selected a delta-wing configuration, with a thick wing root section. This configuration would prove crucial toward providing the fuel capacity necessary to complete the airplane's mission. Whereas the F-16 was able to reserve volume in its wing structure for only 19-percent of its total required fuel capacity, the Lavi was able to reserve space for roughly 54-percent of its internal fuel capacity within its wings - allowing crucial volume in its fuselage to be reserved for other needs.

The selection of a delta wing configuration for the Lavi had a variety of implications - above and beyond the available fuel volume. The spars that carry the span-wise load through the wing of an airplane are essentially tapered I-beams in their cross-section. As any freshman engineering student should know, the modulus of an I-beam will increase as the height of the I-beam cubed, and the bending stress of an I-beam will decrease as the height of the I-beam squared. The result was that due to its thicker wing root, the Lavi wing structure was inherently stronger, and could carry more weight than its counterparts.

It was this kind of structural trade that allowed the Lavi to achieve a maximum take-off weight that was 13-percent greater than a Block 30 F-16C, with an empty weight that was 10-percent less.  Or measured another way, which allowed the Lavi to achieve a hi-lo-hi combat radius that was 50-percent greater than a Block 40 F-16C, with an empty weight that was 20-percent less.

Added to the inherent structural advantage of the Lavi's thicker wing root section, was the incorporation of composite materials. The Lavi airframe was intended to be 22-percent composite materials by weight - compared to the roughly 2-percent of the airframe weight found on the F-16A. The incorporation of composites allowed such structures as the Lavi wing, vertical tail, canard, air brakes, and ventral strakes to be lighter. They also, however, reduced drag, and allowed for the incorporation of aeroelastic tailoring to further improve on performance.

The Lavi was intended, for example, to carry many of its weapons loads semi-conformally on under-fuselage hard points. When combined with aeroelastic tailoring to reduce stores-induced wing flutter, it was expected that aerodynamic drag could be reduced on the Lavi by up to 50-percent. This degree of refinement had simply not been available at the time that the F-16 was developed a decade before.

The selection of the Lavi wing arrangement, however, was only one of many design trades that went into the development of the airplane. Another example was provided by the Lavi's inlet arrangement. The developers of the Lavi evaluated multiple candidate inlet configurations, from the axisymmetric arrangement seen on the Kfir, to side-mounted inlets, to the ventral inlet that was eventually selected. Evaluated on the basis of inlet distortion at high angles of attack, both the side-mounted, "shielded pitot" style inlet, and the ventral inlet offered superior performance with lower inlet distortion. Eventually, however, the ventral inlet was down-selected for the Lavi by virtue of its lower structural weight.

Similarly, multiple configurations for the Lavi vertical tail were initially assessed. Among the more unusual was the tail-boom configuration, which offered superior directional stability at very high angles of attack. Once again, however, the Lavi developers down-selected to a more conventional, single vertical tail, due to its lighter weight.

Among the most central design choices made by the Lavi developers, was the selection of its canard-delta configuration. Canard fighter designs fall into two general categories: close-coupled, and long-coupled. Close-coupled canard designs place the canard in close proximity to, and slightly above the wing, to maximize the canard-wing interaction and increase the airplane's lift-to-drag ratio. This design approach includes such aircraft as the Kfir, Gripen, and Rafale - in addition to the Lavi. Long-coupled fighter designs, in contrast, attempt to leverage the high angle-of-attack control authority that the canard offers, while reducing the size and wetted area of the canard to its bare minimum. These designs, as represented by the Rockwell-MBB X-31A, or by the Eurofighter Typhoon, will tend to maximize the distance between the canard and the wing, and will position the canard at the same elevation, or perhaps slightly lower, than the wing.

Relative to its wing size, the Lavi had the largest canard of any fighter or fighter prototype yet developed. It was also positioned closer to its wing than most of its counterparts, resulting in a greater improvement in aerodynamic efficiency. This, in turn, further enhanced the Lavi's combat radius.

The other leading design decision that had to be made early in its development, was the airplane's engine selection - which was integral with the overall airplane sizing process. The Lavi fighter was originally sized around the F404 engine, at the time of the program launch in February 1980. As the requirements of the program expanded, however, it soon outgrew its original engine selection, and the design was relaunched in May of 1981 with the larger PW1120 engine. The PW1120 afforded a 28-percent increase in available engine thrust, which translated into a larger airframe, with up to a 19-percent increase in combat radius.

Despite its focus on the air-to-ground role, however, the Lavi still needed to be able to perform a secondary air-to-air function. A first order assessment for how the Lavi would have performed in this role can be obtained by comparing the thrust-to-weight ratio, and wing loading of the Lavi to similar values for its counterparts. In general, aircraft with higher thrust-to-weigh ratios will tend to offer superior acceleration, and aircraft with lower wing loadings will tend to offer superior, instantaneous turn rates. This comparison is valid for trends only, however, since it lacks any correction for differences in the aerodynamic performance of each design.

Compared in this fashion, it can be seen that the Lavi and the F-16A were developed with very different strategies in the air-to-air arena. Building on historical experience with such lightweight fighter designs as the F-5E, the F-16A sought to maximize its advantage in thrust-to-weight ratio over its peers of the day.  The Lavi, in contrast, still had to perform its primary mission as an air-to-ground platform. It could not therefore expect to meet or exceed the thrust-to-weight capability of aircraft such as the F-16, seeking instead to leverage its advantage in wing loading to attain a higher turn rate.

It can also be seen from this comparison that, as additional strike roles were added to the F-16, weight was also added in order to increase payload capability. Advances in engine technology allowed the F-16 to maintain its high thrust-to-weight ratio with each successive Block release, but its wing loading continued to climb - impacting turning performance.

A more complete story of relative aircraft performance can be achieved using an energy-maneuverability, or "E-M" diagram. The E-M diagram will portray isocontours of specific excess power, plotted against speed or Mach number on the horizontal axis, and either altitude or turn rate on the vertical axis. Regions where the specific excess power is positive, will denote zones where the airplane is able to accelerate or gain altitude. Regions where the specific excess power is negative, will denote zones where the airplane will lose either speed or altitude. The isocontour where specific excess power is zero, will identify the maximum sustained turn rate for the airplane at that particular speed, altitude, and weight combination. The E-M diagram also allows us to compare competing fighter designs, to evaluate regions of the flight envelope where each is at a relative advantage.

In the instance of both the Lavi and the F-16A, there is published data available from the open literature allowing us to develop an unofficial, approximate E-M diagram from which to make just such a comparison. As anticipated, the Lavi would be expected to achieve an advantage at elevated turn rates. The F-16A, in contrast, would be expected to achieve an advantage at lower turn rates - where it could out-accelerate the Lavi.

In summation therefore, it should be apparent that the design of the Lavi was biased from its inception towards the air-to-ground role - a factor that drove its design towards lighter-weight options that maximized the airplane's range and structural efficiency. This emphasis was very different from its contemporaries, most of which were biased towards short-range, air-to-air objectives. The influence of this emphasis can be clearly seen in the design of the Lavi, where it is stamped large onto its design configuration

Again, this has been but a brief overview of the technical side of the story surrounding the Lavi.  Additional information about this program and its history can be found in the recently published book, Lavi: The United States, Israel, and a Controversial Fighter Jet.


Bibliography

Golan, John. Lavi: The United States, Israel, and a Controversial Fighter Jet (Sterling, VA: Potomac, 2016).
Shmul, Menachem, Eli Erenthal, and Moshe Attar. “Lavi Flight Control System.” International Journal of Control. No. 1, 1994: 159-182.
Tsach, S., and A. Peled. “Evolution of the Lavi Fighter Aircraft,” in Proceedings of the 16th International Council of the Aeronautical Sciences (ICAS) (Jerusalem: Aug. 28 - Sept. 2, 1988): 827-841.

Lavi - A Book Review from Moshe Arens

It was gratifying this past week to see my book reviewed by Moshe Arens, the man who as an Israeli Member of Knesset and later Minister of Defense was instrumental in promoting the launch of the program and its eventual evolution towards the long-range, survivable strike-fighter that it eventually became.
http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Books-Who-shot-down-the-Lavi-446763

Moshe Arens describes it as an "excellent book," that "describes the Byzantine intricacies that were involved" in the behind-the-scenes political battles surrounding the Lavi program.

Most notably, however, Dr. Arens was also a member of Israel's Cabinet at the time of the Lavi cancellation, going on in his review to provide additional details and insight into the Cabinet vote that ultimately cancelled the Lavi. As Arens illuminates, Labor Party leader Shimon Peres was swayed at the time, among other factors, by the advice of Al Schwimmer. Schwimmer was one of the founders of Israel Aircraft Industries who had gone on the record as opposing the Lavi in favor of launching a "next generation" fighter - presumably a stealth aircraft. The coalition campaigning for the Cabinet to cancel the program therefore spanned between Shimon Peres and the call for a new, more advanced development effort, and former Defense Minister Ezer Weizman who had previously endorsed the Lavi as a lightweight, single-role A-4 replacement - and not as the multi-role, deep-strike fighter that the Lavi had become. In Arens' words:

During the cabinet debate we were treated to the bizarre spectacle of Peres arguing for the cancellation of the Lavi because it was not sufficiently advanced, while Weizman argued for the cancellation because the Lavi was in his opinion too advanced an aircraft.

Of course, no follow-on fighter development effort was ever funded following the cancellation of the Lavi, and Israel's aerospace industry has never fully recovered from the cancellation. Israel Aircraft Industries went from a work force of some 22,000 employees in August of 1987, to 17,050 just one year later, to fewer than 14,000 employees by 1994. Even today, decades after the fact, IAI employs just a little over 16,000 employees.

The cancellation of the Lavi was but one example where decisions that are made on one day, can have far reaching effects that span across decades to come.

Lavi Book: Illustrations

As I had previously indicated, the one thing that I would most have liked to have seen done differently with my recently published book on the Lavi, would have been to include more photographs, more illustrations, and to have seen them published in color.

So in that vein, I am posting a copy of the proposed illustration package for the book - in full color. I hope everyone enjoys.

A Familiar Cast - A Familiar Script

For those of us who followed the development of the Lavi fighter program decades ago, there was a familiar name in the news this past week - one providing current emphasis to how little has truly changed in Washington.

Thomas Pickering was ambassador to Israel from 1985 to 1988, at the height of the behind-the-scenes campaign - led by then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and aided by many in the rank and file of the State Department - to convince Israel to cancel the Lavi program. As ambassador, Pickering helped to shuttle Weinberger's protege, Dov Zakheim between meetings with Israeli officials: both arranging the meetings and reinforcing Zakheim's message after he returned to Washington. These included meetings between Zakheim and the leadership of Israel's religious parties, aimed at taking advantage of Israel's secular-religious divide in the campaign to cancel the program. Moreover, Pickering performed these roles, despite the fact that his lobbying campaign was never approved by Secretary of State George Shultz, who had been personally responsible for securing President Reagan's endorsement for the Lavi program and for U.S. funding to support it.[1]

Thomas Pickering appeared again in the news this past week, in a series of emails amidst the trove of official documents recovered from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's personal email server. In the emails, dated from December 2011, Pickering suggests that the United States should covertly engage "third parties and a number of NGOs" (non-governmental organizations) to engage in "protests and demonstrations to put peace back in the center of people's aspirations."[2]

Pickering's proposals were not the first, nor the last time that State Department officials and advisors had proposed that the United States should intervene in Israel's internal politics. They do however, underscore how enduring the pervasive, corporate culture of the State Department has become. Pickering was not some political appointee to an obscure ambassadorship. Rather, he was a high ranking career diplomat, who has held ambassador roles to Israel, Jordan, India, Russia, and the United Nations.

What is most disturbing about Pickering's proposals to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is not that a State Department adviser was again suggesting that the U.S. should covertly intervene on the internal Israeli political scene, but rather the sheer naivete of his proposal. To believe that the U.S. could engage the Palestinian masses to launch "protests and demonstrations", and that such protests would remain peaceful and not degenerate into another round of violence, speaks volumes for how disconnected the State Department elite has become from reality. Israel is today combating a wave of stabbing attacks and shootings, perpetrated by Palestinians whose leaders continue to hale such violence as the acts of "martyrs". Only three weeks ago, for example, two Israelis died in Jerusalem as the result of one such stabbing attack - the latest in a string of such violence.[3] Only this past week, the Palestinian Authority - Israel's diplomatic partner under the Oslo Accords - declared the perpetrator of another such attack (a shooting that killed two Israelis) to be a "martyr" for the Palestinian cause.[4] The disconnect between the rose-colored narrative to which the State Department's leading diplomats subscribe, and the deadly consequences of the real world could hardly be more stark.

There was a familiar name in the news this past week. A familiar reminder of how little has truly changed on the Washington scene.


References:
[1] John Golan, Lavi: The United States, Israel, and a Controversial Fighter Jet (Sterling, VA: Potomac, 2016).
[2] Gil Ronen, "Clinton Mulled Secret Plan to Spark Palestinian Unrest," Erutz Sheva (January 11, 2016), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/206290.
[3] Daniel K. Eisenbud, "Two Israelis Wounded in Jerusalem Terror Attack Die of Injuries," The Jerusalem Post (December 23, 2015), http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Breaking-At-least-three-wounded-in-suspected-stabbing-attack-at-Jerusalems-Jaffa-Gate-438171.
[4] Khaled Abu Toameh, "Palestinian Authority Joins Hamas in Declaring Tel Aviv Gunman 'a Martyr,'" The Jerusalem Post (January 9, 2016), http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Palestinian-Authority-joins-Hamas-in-declaring-Tel-Aviv-gunman-as-martyr-440925.

Lavi: The Lost Chapters - A Future and a Hope

The Lavi Technology Demonstrator - the last of a breed

I am often asked: could it happen again today? Could Israel develop its own fighter aircraft once more? The answer to this, like so many things, is not a simple one. It is a matter not merely of technological capability or even political will, but of the strategic imperative that might necessitate such a program.

In terms of technological capability, the difficulty that would be faced in reviving Israel’s fighter design and development expertise should not be underestimated. The last fighter jet to be successfully designed and manufactured in Israel was the Kfir, of which only 212 were built. The last Kfir rolled off the assembly line in 1986.[1] The Lavi, of course, never got past the prototype stage. Only three prototypes were ever completed, and the flight test and qualification program was cut short. Moreover, all of the engineers and technicians that worked on the Lavi have long since retired and left the industry. Ovadia Harrari, the Lavi’s Project Manager and Chief Engineer, retired from IAI in 2005, and passed away in July 2012.[2] Akiva Peled, one of the lead engineers behind the Lavi program, and who would later go on to become IAI’s Deputy Manager for Preliminary Design, retired in 2014.[3] If Israel were ever to launch a new jet fighter development program, all of that accumulated expertise, from the development of the Kfir, through the Aryeh concept studies, to the Lavi development and flight test program, would have to be recreated. Everything from the practicalities of structural design, systems integration, fly-by-wire control systems development, and manufacturing processes would all need to be relearned once more. Aircraft design is not something that can be learned by wrote from a textbook. It is a skill set that is learned by execution, by making the often painful mistakes and hard-earned lessons necessary for future success. Reviving Israel’s atrophied fighter design experience would be a monumental undertaking.

That being said, if it was a true, national priority for Israel to undertake such a development effort, no one should underestimate the ability of Israeli developers to supply whatever means are necessary to ensure Israel’s national defense. Israeli industry has succeeded in developing a wide variety of extremely complex weapons systems, from airborne early warning and control systems, to anti-ballistic missile systems, to an array of unmanned air vehicles. Israeli radar, avionics, sensors and missile systems remain global leaders to this day. And Israel continues to supply major airframe components for a variety of applications – including manufacturing the wings for the F-35 “stealth” fighters scheduled for delivery to Israel beginning in 2016.[4]

Technologically speaking, if need be, Israel could surmount the challenges to developing a new indigenous fighter program. But many of the same challenges would still remain that had likewise existed at the time of the Lavi. Israel is not, nor can it expect to be a leading developer for jet engines. Like many other indigenous fighter programs throughout the world, including Sweden’s JAS-39 Gripen, India’s Tejas, Japan’s F-2, Taiwan’s Ching-Kuo, or South Korea’s FA-50, Israel would remain reliant on a U.S.-supplied jet engine. But the greater obstacles that any future Israeli fighter program would face would be those same challenges that ultimately doomed the Lavi program – including the challenge to identify the necessary development resources and sufficient production volume to justify such an ambitious program.

Most if not all of the indigenous jet fighter programs developed over the past half century have been fueled by national pride rather than by strategic necessity. Those smaller nations that have gone on to develop and procure their own fighters have invested far more resources than would otherwise have been needed, had they chosen to procure off-the-shelf aircraft from the United States or Western Europe. Moreover, very few of these local fighter efforts offered any real capability advantage over their existing competitors, with the vast majority producing indigenous aircraft with less range, less payload, and poorer air-to-air qualities than could have been afforded by an existing or modified aircraft.

But while arguments of national pride might be sufficient motivation to propel national fighter programs elsewhere, they are not sufficient in Israel. The national security challenges that Israel faces are real, not theoretical, and there is no place in Israel’s defense budget for exercises in national pride. Israel’s military might is expected to be used, and used intensively, either as a deterrent to war, or in operational, wartime missions.

Where local Israeli weapons systems have been procured instead of their U.S. counterparts, it has been because there was a specific, tactical or strategic advantage afforded by the Israeli weapons. Israel has continued to procure Python 4 and 5 missiles, not because they were cheaper than the U.S.-produced Sidewinder, but because they delivered a tactical advantage and enhanced kill envelope that their U.S. counterparts did not. Likewise, Israel’s layered missile defense system – from the short-range Iron Dome to the intermediate range David’s Sling to the long-range Arrow missile systems – was developed precisely because there was no equivalent capability available in the U.S. or elsewhere. No other nation lives with the very real threat of ballistic missile bombardment against their major population centers, by neighbors that have pledged to wipe them off the map. And to this day, Israel continues to procure and enhance the Merkava main battle tank – precisely because there is no direct equivalent to be had.

Taking the Merkava as an example, Israel has continued to develop new and enhanced capabilities for their armored corps at a time when investment and innovation in armored vehicle technology has largely stagnated elsewhere. Beginning in 2010, Israeli developers began adding the Trophy active protection system to the Mk. IV version of the Merkava main battle tank – offering yet another layer in protection against anti-tank missiles. The Trophy system combines an array of radar sensors to detect and track incoming missile threats, together with a battery of explosive, pellet discharge systems that promise to detonate incoming missiles in a cloud of debris before they ever reach the tank’s armor. Beginning with confrontations in Gaza in 2011 the Trophy system has proven its worth as the first battle-tested system of its kind.[5] The Merkava continues to be an example of the priority that Israel’s armed forces place on crew protection that is unequaled in the world.

In stark contrast to this, Israel has migrated away from producing its own large missile boats, seeking instead to procure platforms from established shipyards overseas. The Israel Shipyards that produced the Saar 4 and 4.5 missile boats during the 1970s and 1980s, were left vacant when the Israeli navy went on to procure the Saar 5 missile boats from the United States in the 1990s, or the Saar 6 missile boats, which are being procured from Germany today.[6] Unlike the Merkava, Israeli defense officials concluded that Israeli hull designs offered no unique advantage over their foreign-built counterparts, and focused instead on outfitting foreign-designed warships with Israeli electronics and weapons systems. Practical need, not national pride, has of necessity dictated Israeli procurement decisions.

What is therefore lacking is not just the technological or political means for developing another Israeli fighter, but the strategic necessity that might drive such a decision. The Lavi was launched at a time when there was no U.S. lightweight fighter capable of achieving the combat radius or payload demanded of the Lavi. Today, Israeli F-15I and F-16I fighters fulfill that same role, negating one of the primary motives behind launching the Lavi program. The Lavi was also designed to be more survivable than its U.S. counterparts – although some of that advantage has likewise been eroded as Israeli electronics and weapons packages have been redesigned to integrate into U.S.-built airframes.

Whether this situation will forever remain true in the future, of course, is impossible to foresee. Israeli officials have reportedly already approached Lockheed-Martin, the manufacturer for the F-35 “stealth” fighter, with proposals for extending the useful combat radius of the F-35 to match that of the earlier F-15I and F-16I platforms. The Israeli proposals reportedly fall into two categories: shorter-term concepts, centering on a drop-tank arrangement whereby both the drop tank and pylon would be jettisoned – restoring the low-observable, “stealth” characteristics of the fighter once it approached its target zone; and another, longer-term concept, involving the addition of low-observable, conformal fuel tanks, reportedly already under development in Israel. The latter option, in particular, would require extensive modification to the F-35 airframe, both to supply suitable plumbing for fuel as well as mounting points for the conformal tanks.[7] Lockheed Martin has reportedly been cold to such proposals, fearing that an Israeli-developed, evolved F-35 could become a competitor to Lockheed-Martin’s own proposals for F-35 upgrades.[8]

It therefore remains to be seen as to whether Israel will ever again re-enter the fighter jet business. The obstacles to such a program are immense. Like the Lavi, to be practical, such a program would likely require the identification of a U.S. partner to co-manufacture the airplane – allowing it to compete for sales in the U.S. and increase its production volume to a more practical level. Like the Lavi, without a specific strategic objective in mind – an objective that could not be met by an off-the-shelf or modified U.S. fighter – it is unlikely that such a proposal would ever be endorsed within Israel’s military leadership. Such a confluence of events is highly unlikely. Nor is it necessarily a desirable outcome. Israel’s strategic interests would be better served by purchasing more aircraft, not fewer – provided that the U.S.-supplied weapons platforms meet Israel’s minimal tactical and strategic objectives. It has been the hope behind this book that the lessons of the past may yet be learned. The likelihood of a future Israeli-developed fighter jet is remote. In our uncertain and troubled world, however, it also still remains a distinct possibility.


Notes

[1] Raanan Weiss and Shlomo Aloni, IAI Kfir in IAF Service (Bat-Hefer, Israel: IsraDecal Publications, 2007), 15.

[2] “Ovadia Harari, Former Executive Vice President & COO of Israel Aerospace Industries and Director of the ‘Lavi’ Fighter Aircraft Program has Passed Away,” Israel Aerospace Industries, July 16, 2012, http://www.iai.co.il/2013/36756-44604-EN/MediaRoom_News.aspx.

[3] Itai Kaufman (IAI) to John Golan, April 28, 2015.

[4] Barbara Opall-Rome, “Accent on U.S.-Israel Alliance as IAI, Lockheed Launch F-35 Wing Line,” DefenseNews, November 4, 2014, http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20141104/DEFREG/311040028/Accent-US-Israel-Alliance-IAI-Lockheed-Launch-F-35-Wing-Line.

[5] Yuval Azulai, “Rafael’s Trophy System has Intercepted Five Anti-Tank Missiles Aimed at Armored IDF Vehicles in Gaza,” Globes, July 20, 2014, http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-debut-for-anti-tank-missile-defense-system-1000956678.

[6] The Saar 6 is a version of the “Meko” class missile corvette, also produced as the K-130 for the Germany navy. Under the terms of the deal, the German government is expected to subsidize 25% of the cost for the four Saar missile boats on order. Tamir Eshel, "Germany, Israel Sign €430 Million Contract for 4 Meko Class Corvettes," Defense Update, May 11, 2015, http://defense-update.com/20150511_meko80.html.

[7] Barbara Opall-Rome, "Eyeing Iran, Israel Readies for Stealth Strike Fighter," DefenseNews, September 5, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/09/05/eyeing-iran-israel-readies-stealth-strike-fighter/71608464/.

[8] "Lockheed Worried About IDF Unauthorized 'Modifications' in F-35," Jewish Press, September 6, 2015, http://www.jewishpress.com/news/breaking-news/lockheed-worried-about-idf-unauthorized-modifications-in-f-35/2015/09/06/.