National Best Interest

As I discuss in a recent Opinion/Editorial posted in the Jerusalem Post International Edition, despite what some of Israel's detractors might profess, U.S. military assistance to Israel has never been an act of charity: it is a strategic investment dictated by America's own national self-interest

Providing military assistance to Israel is far, far cheaper than sending U.S. soldiers to fight wars in the Eastern Mediterranean, and far cheaper than similar U.S. investments to defend NATO in Europe, or U.S. allies in the Far East.

In that same vein, as a strategic investment, getting the most out of U.S. military assistance to Israel also dictates that the U.S. should leverage Israeli resources and technology, wherever possible. Israeli innovation has been a constant source of fresh ideas and practical application that has benefited the defense of both nations.

Jerusalem Post: National Best Interest

The F-35, F-16 and Lavi - And History Repeating Itself

In March 1977 the Israeli government approached the Carter Administration with a formal proposal for license-production of the F-16 in Israel. Behind this request - above and beyond a desire to insulate the Israeli armed forces from the suspensions in arms deliveries that had accompanied past arrangements with France and the UK - was a desire to remold the F-16 into a more versatile strike fighter, with the range and payload that the Israeli armed forces needed. The United States had recently entered into a co-production agreement for the F-16 with its NATO partners in Europe, and in subsequent years would agree to the licensed production of the F-16 by Turkey and South Korea. It seemed, at the time, like a reasonable request.

For a variety of reasons however, the Carter Administration rejected the Israeli proposal. The Carter Administration was unwilling to grant the Israelis any degree of arms independence, prefering to maintain all possible leverage for future diplomacy. General Dynamics' Fort Worth Division, which produced the F-16 was also apprehensive that an Israeli-developed version of the F-16 might prove superior to the aircraft that were produced at its own plant, and could compete for foreign sales. It was an irrational fear - given that Israel would have been no more free to re-export the aircraft than were the European partners already producing the F-16 locally - but it was a fear nonetheless.

The Israeli armed forces had a long history of modifying the weapons that they used to better suit their specific needs. A decade earlier, they had entered into a co-production agreement with France's Dassault, to develop the air-to-air Mirage III into a more versatile strike fighter, labeled the Mirage 5 - with the range and payload that the Israeli armed forces needed. The request to develop a more capable version of the F-16 was therefore not unique. Developing the existing F-16 airframe into the longer-range strike platform that was needed to meet Israeli objectives was the option preferred by the Israeli armed forces. It would have been the cheapest means to meeting their goals.

The No. 2 Lavi prototype is rolled out (GPO)

The Israeli government approached the Carter Administration a second time in 1980 with a request to license-produce the F-16 in Israel. They were again turned down. Shortly thereafter, the Israeli government launched the Lavi fighter program, aimed at providing the type of strike fighter that the Israeli air force needed. Producing an indigenous fighter in Israel was a more expensive means to that end, but at the time it was the only option remaining. The aircraft developed featured the kind of range that the early F-16 models did not have. The kind of range needed to strike targets as far away as Iran. Launched to meet the specific IDF needs that the early F-16s could not fulfill, the Lavi eventually came to be seen as a potential competitor by some in the U.S. aerospace industry. Ultimately, after considerable expense and political maneuvering in both the United States and Israel, the Lavi would be cancelled in 1987.

The F-16I: An evolved F-16 with the range the IDF needed (USAF)

In the latter 1990s, as U.S. procurement of the F-16 began to wind down, the U.S. manufacturer of the airplane - now at Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth Division - began to see continued sales to Israel as a necessity for keeping their production line open. At the turn of the century, the Israelis finally received the F-16I: an evolved F-16 with the kind and range and payload that the Israeli armed forces had wanted to develop the F-16 into, back in the late 1970s.[1]

This past month, an Israeli delegation met with officials at Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth Divison, to explore options for developing an evolved version of Lockheed's newest fighter, the F-35. The Israeli officials are looking to develop a version of the F-35 with the kind of range and payload that the Israeli armed forces need.

The F-35: Israel is still negotiating to extend the fighter's range (USAF)

The first phase of this development process reportedly centers on the addition of specialized external fuel tanks. Conventional drop tanks separate from their aircraft, leaving behind a pylon that - for a stealth aircraft - adds significantly to the airplane's radar signature. What the Israelis are proposing - and what they have started development work to produce - is a drop tank wherein both the tank and the pylon would separate from the aircraft, allowing the F-35 to take advantage of its stealth features once it approaches a target.[2]

The longer-term planning, revolves around the development of low-observable, conformal fuel tanks that would add considerably to the range of the F-35, without compromising its stealth properties. The incorporation of this kind of capability in particular, however, will require significant modification to the F-35 airframe - to provide attachment points for the fuel tanks as well as plumbing for the fuel.[3]

Once again, the Israelis have come to the United States looking to develop an evolved version of a U.S. fighter, with the range and payload that the Israeli armed forces need. The kind of range needed to strike targets as far away as Iran. Once again, this same fighter is already being co-produced by U.S. partners in Europe. And once again, there are reports that the U.S. manufacturer of the fighter is concerned that an improved, Israeli-developed version of the F-35 could become a competitor for their own upgrade packages in the export market.[4] There has already been a considerable amount of wrangling, over whether to allow the Israeli Air Force to add its own electronic warfare and secure data-links to the F-35s that it purchases.[5] The latest revelations from this past month suggest that this debate is not yet over.

We can only hope that the U.S. government and U.S. contractors do not repeat the same mistakes that were made in 1977 and 1980. Particularly in this day and age, with the considerable focus on the threat posed by Iran, convincing the Israeli government that there is no U.S. alternative that will meet the needs of the IDF is not likely to have an inexpensive outcome - for anyone involved.


References:
[1] John Golan, Lavi: The United States, Israel, and a Controversial Fighter Jet (Sterling, VA: Potomac, 2016).
[2] David Eshel, "Israel Will Be First Non-U.S. Customer to Fly F-35," Aviation Week Network (June 26, 2013).
[3] Barbara Opall-Rome, "Eyeing Iran, Israel Readies for Stealth Strike Fighter," DefenseNews (September 5, 2015).
[4] "Lockheed Worried About IDF Unauthorized 'Modifications' in F-35," Jewish Press (September 6, 2015).
[5] David Eshel and David Fulghum, "Israel, U.S. Agree to $450 Million in F-35 EW Work," Aviation Week Network (August 6, 2012).

Lavi Cancellation - And the Passage of Time

A Lavi prototype prepares for flight (Israeli Air Force) 

This past week marked the 28th anniversary of the vote to cancel the Lavi program, in 1987.  In the decades that have followed, the chain of events that led the Lavi program to be launched, and which later led to its cancellation, have become ever more clouded by the passage of time. For both the proponents, and opponents of the program, the events that transpired have become more a subject for myth than a topic of studied consideration.

For my part, I have always considered the value of history to be in the lessons that it holds: the opportunity to allow past experience to inform future decisions. Sadly, too little of this has occurred surrounding a program that was once Israel's largest weapons development effort in the history of the Jewish State.

Whether someone believes that the cancellation was a monumental mistake, or that the program should never have been launched, anyone who genuinely cares about the U.S.-Israel relationship and about Israel's future defensive capabilities owes it to themselves to understand this chain of events, and what it means for the future.

Perhaps I am being overly optimistic to believe it possible, but there is still the chance that the painful lessons of the past can still be absorbed by those of us living today.

Lou Lenart - USMC Veteran and IAF Volunteer - 1921-2015

Capt. Lou Lenart in his USMC uniform
in 1945.  (courtesy photo)

Lou Lenart, a World War II American war veteran who volunteered to fly for Israel during the 1948-49 War of Independence, passed away this past week.  He was 94.

Born as Layos Lenovitz in a small Hungarian village in 1921, his family moved to the United States when he was 10.  His family settled in the Pennsylvania town of Wilkes-Barre, where he became the target of anti-Jewish taunts and beatings.  Toughened by his youthful experiences, Lou would go on to enlist with the U.S. Marines, because "I heard they were 'first to fight' and I wanted to kill as many Nazis as I could."  Lenart became a fighter pilot, flying the F4U Corsair in the battle for Okinawa.  Discharged at the end of the war, and facing continued anti-Semitism in the U.S., Lou volunteered to become a pilot for the newly established Israeli Air Force in early 1948.

At the time, Israel was facing an invasion by five Arab armies, while the Western allies - the United States, United Kingdom and France - were enforcing an arms embargo on the new Jewish State.  Whereas the Arab armies of Egypt and Jordan were being supplied and trained by the British army, and the armies of Syria and Lebanon were being supplied and trained by the French, Israel's army relied on clandestine arms deals to equip its new armed forces.

Thus it was that in May 1948, with Egyptian troops marching through on their way to Tel Aviv, that the only fighter planes available to the  Israeli Air Force were a handful of German-designed Me 109 fighters, equipped with engines borrowed from Stuka dive-bombers - newly arrived in crates from Czechoslovakia.  Four fighter planes was all that the Israeli Air Force had at the time.

The original plan had been to use the four airplanes to stage a surprise attack on the Egyptian airfield at El Arish.  However, on May 29 they received an urgent plea for air support from the Israeli defenders south of Tel Aviv, where the Egyptian army had captured the town of Ashdod, just 17 miles from Tel Aviv and 10 miles from the Tel Nof airfield.

As the most experienced pilot of the new Air Force, Lou Lenart was chosen to lead the first sortie of Israel's first fighter squadron.  Making multiple passes in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire, the attack succeeded in halting the Egyptian advance.  Unaware of the truly meager number of fighters that the Israelis had at their disposal, the Egyptian officers ordered their troops to dig in while they waited for direction from their headquarters in Cairo.  Lou Lenart had led the mission that saved Tel Aviv.  As he would later testify, "It was the most important moment of my life, and I was born to be there at that precise moment in history."

Lou Lenart's passing this week comes as a sad reminder that we are fast losing the last survivors from that bitter era.  World War II, the Holocaust, and Israel's War of Independence, is fast becoming the exclusive reserve of history books, and legend, as the last individuals with first-hand memories of that era are lost to us.

Four rag-tag fighters, cobbled together from parts in different factories.  An assorted crew of volunteer pilots: Lou Lenart, the former U.S. Marine; Ezer Weizman and Modi Alon, who had been trained in the RAF but had never seen combat; and Eddie Cohen, a South African volunteer.  We often forget by what a razor thin margin Israel's independence was established.  Eddie Cohen's fighter would be shot down on that sortie, and Ezer Weizman's would be damaged on landing.  Too often we take for granted the survival of the free society in which we live - in Israel and the United States, both then and now.

Lou Lenart would go on after the war to participate in the covert evacuation of Jewish refugees from Iraq to Israel, and later became an airline pilot in Israel's national airline, El Al.

I cannot help but feel that we are today, a little poorer for his passing.  As if part of our collective memory was being lost.  Rest in peace, Lou.  May we never forget all that you, and so many others gave.


References:

Chawkins, Steve. "Lou Lenart Dies at 94; War Hero was 'The Man who Saved Tel Aviv.'" Los Angles Times, July 22, 5015.
Dolsten, Josefin. "Lou Lenart, US Pilot 'Who Saved Tel Aviv,' Dies at 94." The Times of Israel, July 21, 2015.
Pressfield, Steven. The Lion's Gate: On the Front Lines of the Six Day War. New York: Penguin Group, 2014.